Five key issues in the mixed ownership reform of t

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Five key issues in the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises

the reform of mixed ownership is an important breakthrough in the reform of state-owned enterprises. At present, the reform of mixed ownership is still in the pilot process, and various regions have implemented a series of measures to promote the reform. Therefore, based on policy and literature research, this paper puts forward five key issues about the mixed reform, analyzes them and puts forward suggestions, which are as follows: first, the primary goal is to improve the operation efficiency of state-owned enterprises and state-owned capital; Second, it should be closely combined with the supply side structural reform, especially de capacity and de leverage; Third, the top-level guarantee is to establish an appropriate state-owned assets management system from the two levels of the government and state-owned assets platform companies; Fourth, the focus is to create a fair market environment and gradually open up monopoly areas; Fifth, do not neglect to give full play to the advantages of state-owned enterprises and enlarge the functions of state-owned assets

since the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee proposed to actively develop the mixed ownership economy, the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises has attracted extensive attention from all walks of life from the central to local, from theory to practice, from policy to implementation, and so on

at present, the mixed reform is still in the pilot and exploration stage, and there is no unified model for reference. How to further promote and deepen the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises, this paper will extract five key issues about the mixed ownership reform from the existing policies, research and practice, analyze them and put forward suggestions

clarify the primary objective: improve the operation efficiency of state-owned enterprises and state-owned capital

different from the main purpose of state-owned enterprise reform in the 1990s, improving the operation efficiency of state-owned enterprises and state-owned capital should be the primary objective of the mixed reform. The mixed reform is not only the change of property rights, but also the introduction of the flexible market mechanism and innovative management concept of private enterprises into state-owned enterprises, so as to improve business efficiency. Only in this way can there be rules to follow to strengthen, optimize and expand state-owned enterprises and enhance the vitality, control, influence and anti risk ability of the state-owned economy

in recent years, the total assets of state-owned enterprises have achieved rapid growth. Taking the central enterprises as an example, it increased from 10.6 trillion yuan in 2005 to 69.5 trillion yuan in 2016, with an average annual growth rate of 18.7%. However, it must be recognized that many factors such as soft budget constraints, insufficient internal incentives, absence of owners and policy tasks affect the real operating efficiency of state-owned enterprises

the key to the mixed reform is to touch on the low efficiency of state-owned enterprises, introduce external forces to improve the governance structure, and create an environment for state-owned shareholders and minority shareholders to exercise their rights equally, symbiotically and win-win, so as to improve the decision-making and operation efficiency of state-owned enterprises, and optimize the incentive mechanism of state-owned enterprises. In other words, the "prescription" for mixed reform is mainly to cure the lack of vitality of some state-owned enterprises

in addition, it is necessary to prevent "mixed ownership failure". Specifically, there are two kinds of adverse consequences to be vigilant against: one is that state-owned assets still have actual control, including absolute and relative control, and will continue to rely on monopoly advantages and strengthen administrative barriers, while private assets choose to "free ride" to share monopoly profits. Such reform is meaningless; The other is that private capital has actual control, which will induce state-owned assets agents to give up supervision, or even choose to compromise and collude, resulting in the loss of state-owned assets, which puts forward higher requirements for the supervision ability of state-owned assets under the background of mixed reform

closely combined with supply side structural reform

based on the huge size and important position of state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises must bear the brunt of reforming the supply structure of China's economy. Therefore, the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises must be closely combined with the supply side structural reform, and should be promoted around the five tasks of "three deletions, one reduction and one subsidy". In particular, the focus is on de capacity and de leverage

first of all, in terms of capacity reduction, industries with serious overcapacity and inventory backlog are mostly concentrated in state-owned enterprises, so the focus of capacity reduction is naturally state-owned enterprises. In 2016, the capacity reduction task of major industries in China was completed as scheduled. Among them, the central state-owned enterprises resolved 10.19 million tons of excess steel capacity, a completion rate of 141.7%, and 34.97 million tons of excess coal capacity, a completion rate of 109.9%. But what cannot be ignored behind this is that de capacity has not fully played the decisive role of the market in resource allocation. Therefore, resolving excess capacity should rely more on the role of the market, which also requires that state-owned enterprises must change to a complete market player. The mixed reform is just in time. It will rely on external capital to improve the modern enterprise system of state-owned enterprises, accelerate the process of marketization and reduce government intervention

secondly, in terms of deleveraging, according to the calculation of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, by the end of 2015, the leverage ratios of China's financial sector, residential sector, government sector including local financing platforms and non-financial enterprise sector were 21%, 40%, 57% and 156% respectively. Among them, the high leverage of non-financial enterprises is mainly concentrated in state-owned enterprises, especially in overcapacity and capital intensive industries, such as coal, chemical industry, steel, etc. In the economic downturn, they can only borrow new debt to maintain the interest payment and principal repayment of existing debt, which further improves leverage and increases systemic financial risk. Obviously, compared with bank loans, issuance of bonds and government subsidies, the mixed reform can absorb social capital in the form of equity to reduce leverage, and help dispose of "zombie enterprises" and reduce economic risks. The specific methods may include debt to equity swap, capital increase and share expansion, equity replacement, asset securitization, stock asset revitalization, inter enterprise merger and reorganization, etc

do a good job in top-level guarantee: establish an appropriate state-owned asset management system

marketization is one of the two visions of state-owned enterprise reform. The rapid development of market economy has put forward new requirements for the government's ability to supervise state-owned enterprises. Moreover, the government and state-owned enterprises are not only related in property rights, but also in policy, personnel, party affairs and other aspects. Therefore, with the deepening of the mixed reform, the government urgently needs to establish an appropriate state-owned assets management system to do a good job of top-level protection. It should be pointed out that in the general sense, state-owned assets management refers to the work of SASAC, but this is incomplete. This article will discuss from the two aspects of government and state-owned platform companies

firstly, at the government level, since 1978, the government has realized three transformations in the management of state-owned enterprises, from "managing factories" to "managing enterprises", then to "managing assets" and finally to "managing capital". Of course, the last transformation has not been completed. Since its establishment as an ad hoc institution directly under the State Council in 2003, SASAC has played an important role in performing the responsibilities of investors, guiding the reform and restructuring of state-owned enterprises, and promoting the maintenance and appreciation of state-owned assets

other institutions also have an impact on state-owned enterprises. The management system of state-owned enterprises in China is characterized by complexity and strictness. Taking the central enterprises as an example, the SASAC, the Ministry of finance, the National Audit Office, the Organization Department, the Ministry of human resources and social security, the all China Federation of trade unions and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection will all participate in the management of state-owned enterprises. Moreover, Party committees at all levels and Party organizations in enterprises also occupy a pivotal position in the management of state-owned enterprises

secondly, at the level of state-owned platform companies, the guiding opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises proposed to reorganize and establish state-owned capital investment and operation companies, which are collectively referred to as "state-owned platform companies" in this paper. Since 2014, SASAC has carried out two pilot projects for central enterprises. For example, SDIC, Chengtong Group and Guoxin Corporation were reorganized into state-owned capital operating companies, and Shenhua Group, China Minmetals, China Merchants Group, China Communications Group and Poly Group conducted pilot projects for state-owned capital operating companies. In june2017, penghuagang, deputy secretary general and spokesman of SASAC, said at the media communication meeting that in the future, central enterprises will be mainly divided into three categories: real industry groups, investment companies and operating companies

Singapore Temasek mode is specially introduced here. As a typical foreign experience, Temasek asset management company is often mentioned by domestic officials and scholars that it has achieved the requirement of "managing capital". In China, the closest model to the Temasek model is the Huijin model of financial state-owned assets: the Central Huijin Investment Co., Ltd., established in the same year with the SASAC, exercises the rights and responsibilities of investors on behalf of the state to key financial enterprises. Huijin mode adopts the three-tier structure of "Ministry of Finance - Huijin Company - state-owned financial enterprise", which is limited to the amount of capital contribution and linked by equity, and exercises the representative duties of investors through corporate governance channels. This mode of state-owned assets management has also been used for reference by Shanghai, Shenzhen, Shandong and other places. However, compared with Singapore, China's state-owned enterprises have a wide range of industries, a large economic volume, and are essentially undertaking policy tasks that can be used in a multi-layer structure, as well as complex national conditions, which determine that the Temasek or Huijin model is not fully applicable

in a word, the current state-owned assets management system is reasonable to a great extent, so it should be improved on its basis, rather than reinventing the wheel, so as to avoid excessive system cost. Specifically:

at the government level, first of all, the SASAC should fully delegate the responsibilities of investors to the state-owned capital platform companies. At the same time, it should make a good functional separation with them, establish a management structure of "SASAC - state-owned capital platform companies - state-owned enterprises", reduce the intervention in the business of state-owned enterprises, and let the platform companies perform their responsibilities. Other departments indirectly make them implement the will of the government through relevant policies, such as industrial policies Public services, etc. Secondly, state-owned enterprises such as finance, railway and culture should be included to ensure the integrity of state-owned assets management

at the level of state-owned capital platform companies, in order to strengthen, optimize and expand state-owned enterprises and enhance the vitality, control, influence and anti risk ability of the state-owned economy, three types of state-owned capital platform companies are established:

the first type is industrial state-owned capital investment companies that are related to national strategic security and mainly involve key areas of the national economy and natural monopoly industries, such as petroleum, aerospace, military industry, railway, etc. It should focus on one or several leading industries, and the auxiliary industries should be appropriately stripped, with the main purpose of expanding the control of state-owned assets

the second category is diversified state-owned capital investment companies, such as China Resources, poly, China Merchants, etc. It emphasizes investment in different industries, and its subsidiaries are mostly in fully competitive industries. Its main purpose is to expand the vitality and influence of state-owned assets. It should be pointed out that the views of highlighting the main business and separating the main business from the auxiliary business are not applicable to such enterprises, and market competition will naturally allow enterprises to make reasonable choices

the third category is state-owned capital operating companies, such as Chengtong, SDIC and new enterprises such as China's state-owned enterprise structure adjustment fund company and China's state-owned capital venture capital fund company, which were newly established in recent years to strengthen the research and development of core key technologies. It maintains and increases the value of state-owned assets through the capital market, and also supports investment in innovative industries as a "national team", the main purpose of which is to enlarge the functions of state-owned assets

identify the focus: create a fair market environment and open up monopoly areas

according to the data of the National Bureau of statistics, the growth rate of private fixed asset investment has continued to decline in recent years: from 24.8% in 2012 to 10.1% in 2015, and fell back to single digits in 2016, and the gap with the national growth rate has become more obvious, reaching 6.2% at the maximum

restricted channels are an important reason for the decline in the growth rate of private investment, which hinders the mixed reform to a certain extent, because many state-owned enterprises are in monopoly industries. Therefore, whether it is to fully release the power of investment to stimulate economic growth, or focus on accelerating the mixed reform, it is required to dredge investment for private capital

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